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The Impact of Media and Monitoring on Corruption in Decentralized Public Programs: 
Evidence from Madagascar 
 
1. Introduction 
Corruption and poverty are strongly related.  Corruption reduces growth (e.g., Mauro, 
1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) while corruption itself reduces with income and education 
(e.g., Glaeser et al., 2004; Glaeser and Saks, 2004).  Recently, the importance of limiting 
corruption to reduce poverty has been emphasized; among other things to improve the 
efficiency of public service delivery programs.
1  In a well-documented study, Reinikka and 
Svensson (2004a) find that in the early 1990s in Uganda only 13 percent of non-wage public 
expenditures on primary education actually reached the primary schools.  The bulk of the 
public grants was captured by local government officials and politicians who were supposed 
to disburse the funds to the local schools.  Similar analyses for other African countries, 
including Tanzania, Ghana, and Zambia, confirm that local capture is a serious problem in 
educational programs as between 50% and 75% of non-wage funds were diverted (Reinikka 
and Svensson, 2004a).  
These findings suggest that anticorruption programs should be a crucial part of poverty 
reduction strategies as to increase the efficiency of public spending on services for the poor.  
Fighting corruption of local officials and politicians can be done in a variety of ways 
(Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, 1999).  However, some of the more standard approaches may not 
be effective.  Some argue that the reliance on legal institutions, such as the policy and the 
judiciary, may be ineffective, as these institutions themselves tend to be corrupt in countries 
                                                 
1 The 2004 World Development Report emphasizes the importance of “making services work for poor people” in 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals.  Developing countries typically spend little of their government 
budgets on education, health and infrastructure services that poor people need. Furthermore, even when public 
spending is earmarked for poor people, for example by allocating funds for the poor’s primary education and 
health care, the money does not always reach the frontline service providers. 
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characterized by extensive capture of public funds (e.g., Klitgaard and Baser, 1998; Ahrend, 
2002).  An alternative approach, analyzed by Reinikka and Svensson (2004a,b), is to rely on 
monitoring by the beneficiaries of the services.  Increasing the information flow on the 
disbursement of public funds to the intended beneficiaries is expected to empower citizens at 
the bottom of the service delivery chain in their interactions with local officials and politicians 
and, thereby, to increase pressure on them to pass on the funds.   
The media can play an important role in this process.  In general, Besley and Burgess 
(2001, 2002) show that an electorate better informed by mass media strengthens incentives for 
a government to be responsive.  In their analysis, newspaper circulation plays a substantial 
role in increasing political accountability.  Strömberg (2004a,b) shows how radio access 
influences redistributive programs. Djankov et al. (2003) conclude that government 
ownership of the media is generally associated with less press freedom, fewer political and 
economic rights and inferior social outcomes in the areas of education and health.  Drèze and 
Sen (1990) state that India, which has a free media, has avoided famines more successfully 
than China, which lacks free media.  Mazharul and Saidul (2000) show that radio and 
television are two important mass media for disseminating family planning information in 
Bangladesh.  Stapenhurst (2000) and Ahrend (2002) find evidence that a lack of press 
freedom leads to higher levels of corruption.  More specifically, Reinikka and Svensson 
(2004b) find that in Uganda a newspaper campaign to boost citizens’ awareness of public 
spending on educational programs had a dramatic effect in reducing local capture, and that 
proximity to newspaper outlets was positively related to schools’ reception of public funds, 
consistent with a positive impact of the media. 
In this paper we analyze the impact of the media on local capture of public 
expenditures on education in Madagascar. Our analysis is based on data collected in a budget 
tracking survey in 2002-2003.  The survey measured the extent to which public spending on   4
education reached the local schools.  We compare cash flows from the central government to 
24 decentralized district facility levels and from these district levels to 185 public primary 
schools.  This unique dataset allows us to study the level and determinants of local capture. 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, the analysis shows 
that corruption in public programs can be successfully constrained.  We find that a large share 
of the funds arrived at the school level in the 2002-2003 program in Madagascar.  While there 
was a significant delay, 98% of the total budget allocated by the central government arrived at 
district level and 90% of the total sum of intended grants mentioned by all district officers 
arrived at school level.  Still, in one fifth of the schools the amount received did not 
correspond with the amount declared as sent by the district facility.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the diverted funds were used for purposes unrelated to education or for private 
gain of local district officials.  
Second, we show that the media can have an important impact on corruption, but that 
the impact of the media is conditional upon characteristics of the population.  Our analysis 
confirms the impact of mass media on reducing corruption.  However, we find that the impact 
is conditional on characteristics of the population.  When many poor are illiterate, the impact 
of newspaper and poster campaigns is limited, and radio and television are more important 
media tools.  Moreover, we find that the impact of local radio and television access on 
reducing capture is more important when illiteracy is more widespread.   
Third, while Reinikka and Svensson (2004a,b) focus their attention on the role of 
monitoring by the beneficiaries (i.e. monitoring “from below”), we also analyze the 
importance of monitoring “from above”, i.e. by the central agencies, which are implementing 
the public policy.  We find that monitoring from above – which is measured by distance from 
the centre – also has a strong impact on capture.  Our findings also provide evidence of the   5
importance of “remoteness” or geographical isolation in development, an issue emphasized in 
contributions by e.g. Krugman (1991) and Gallup et al. (1998).
2  
Finally, our findings taken together have implications for the debate on 
decentralization of public service delivery in developing countries (e.g., Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 1999, 2000, 2006; Faguet, 2000; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; King and Özler, 2002).  
In Madagascar, public services are heavily concentrated at the central level with about 88% of 
expenditures executed at that level (World Bank, 2004).  However, the sector of education is 
more decentralized than others, with 55% of recurrent expenditures allocated to the provincial 
and district levels.  Besides, the government – with the support of several international 
donors
3 – increasingly relies on decentralized interventions and entities to improve 
educational services.  A key institutional player in this respect is the district facility level.  
Our findings indicate important constraints on decentralization of public service delivery, in 
particular in the most remote areas. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The policy framework is described in Section 2. 
Section 3 provides information on the monitoring policy in the education sector of 
Madagascar and focuses in particular on the role of the mass media as a monitoring tool.  
Section 4 describes the methodology used to measure capture and its determinants.  The 
conceptual and empirical models are depicted in Section 5 and 6 respectively.  Section 7 




                                                 
2 They show that geographical isolation implies large welfare costs.  Krugman (1991) addresses the relationship 
between geography and international trade.  Gallup et al. (1998) investigate the ways in which location may have 
a direct impact on growth.  Fafchamps and Shilpi (2003) find that geographical isolation significantly reduces 
subjective welfare.  Fafchamps and Moser (2003) and Fafchamps and Minten (2006) show that remoteness is 
positively correlated with crime in Madagascar.   
3 E.g. the World Bank, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD).   6
2.  The Policy Framework   
Following a series of institutional reforms that started in 1995, the education ministry 
is today the most decentralized government service in Madagascar with three different levels 
of governance (World Bank, 2005).  First, the central authority is the Ministry of Education 
(MINESEB
4) which is located in the capital, Antananarivo.  Second, each of the six provinces 
of Madagascar has its own education administration (DIRESEB
5).  Their main task is to 
regulate, supervise and design policies for the sector.  However, in practice the central level 
retains major delivery functions and DIRESEB officials cannot alter budget or material 
allocations.  Third, there are 111 districts (also referred to as “regions” or “fivondronana”) 
and 1392 communes (or communities).
6  Each district has a district education office (CISCO 
– Circonscription Scolaire), which is responsible for the distribution of money and material to 
the public primary schools situated in the communes of their district. 
Madagascar has low school enrolment rates, even by African standards (e.g., Glick et 
al., 2000; Razafindravonona et al., 2001; Larson et al., 2006).  According to a recent World 
Bank (2002) study, only 60% of the urban children completed primary school.  In rural areas, 
where most people live, the rate is even much lower as only 12% of children in rural areas 
completed primary school.
7  
In the aftermath of a political crisis in 2002, the new government, in collaboration with 
the donor community, decided to introduce a significant public investment program in 
education to increase enrolment in schooling.  The new government decided to use part of the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative funds to pay the tuition fee of all students 
                                                 
4 MINESEB = Ministère de l’Education Secondaire et de l’Education de Base 
5 DIRESEB = Direction Provincial de l’Education Secondaire et de l’Education de Base 
6 Hence, on average there are 18 districts per province and 13 communes per district. 
7 In 2002, education, like all public services, was further negatively affected by a dispute on the outcome of 
presidential elections in December 2001, which threw Madagascar into a political and economic crisis.  General 
strikes and roadblocks hit the economy and halted social service delivery in the country.  The crisis was resolved 
in June 2002, but the impact was severe.  Regarding education, a significant number of parents were unable to 
pay for schooling and health costs after the political crisis (Cornell University, 2003).   7
in public primary schools.  For every registered student, schools would receive 15,000 Francs 
Malagasy (FMg) in the capital city, Antananarivo, and 10,000 FMg in the rest of the country.
8  
This program importantly changed the financing of public education in Madagascar.  
The financing traditionally had three components.  First, the government pays the salaries of 
most teachers, which makes up a large share of the total expenditures.  Second, the 
government finances school equipment by providing a credit line to the district education 
offices (CISCOs).  The latter then distribute the school equipment in-kind to the schools.  The 
CISCOs in principle do not pay salaries, but they are able to hire some teachers on their credit 
line for school equipment if they want to allocate extra teachers to some schools.  Third, all 
additional expenditures of the schools were covered by tuition fees paid by the parents of the 
students.  The tuition fees were set and collected by parents-teachers associations (FRAM
9), 
which therefore paid almost all the non-salary school expenses.  In addition, the FRAM also 
hired extra teachers if necessary.  During the school year 2001-2002, 11% of the total number 
of teachers was hired by the FRAM as contractual workers with no social schemes (Francken, 
2003). 
The objective of the new government policy was to replace most of the tuition fees by 
government grants.  The HIPC payments were introduced as a per student grant and were 
allocated only to public schools.  Later, an additional budget (“CRESED”, financed by a 
World Bank education project) was introduced, which was organized similarly but which 
provided funding to both public and private schools.
10  Officially, the implementation of the 
HIPC program started in August 2002, at the beginning of the school year 2002-2003.  Cash 
                                                 
8 In 2002, 15,000 FMg amounted to approximately 2 USD and 10,000 FMg to 1,5 USD. 
9 FRAM = ‘Fikambanan’ny Ray-Amandrenin’ny Mpianatra’ 
10 After the implementation of both programs, parent contributions fell on average to around 20% of non-salary 
expenditures, while the HIPC government payments make up around 30% and CRESED payments around 40%.  
The remaining part of the budget mainly comes from community-based initiatives, often supported by non-
governmental donor organizations (World Bank, 2004).     8
funds were transferred from the central government to the districts (CISCOs) and district 
officials were to transfer the payments to the public primary schools.
11   
The analysis here concentrates on local capture of the HIPC payments during the 
academic year 2002-2003.  The HIPC payments were an entirely new policy and the surveys 
used in this paper were implemented to measure to what extent funds arrived at the intended 
beneficiaries.  The CRESED payments were implemented later -- too late to be captured by 
the survey.   
 
3.  Monitoring and the Media 
In order to ensure that the HIPC funds would actually arrive at the school level and to 
prevent capture of the funds along the chain, the central government, with strong pressure 
from the donors, put several accompanying measures in place.   
First, it sent letters to the district facilities and the schools explaining the new policy 
and required the CISCOs and the schools to post in a public place the amount of money 
received.  However, although posting of the amount of grants received was a necessary 
condition to receive funds, our survey showed that only 29% of the schools actually did so.
12  
Second, monitoring from the central level was reinforced, reflecting a new emphasis 
by donors and the new government on good governance.  One part of the monitoring was 
audits and controls at the district level.  Based on our interviews and anecdotal evidence it 
appears that the monitoring and inspections, and their effect, varied strongly across districts.  
In general, inspections and monitoring were imperfect and even in case of problems sanctions 
were rare.  This left the opportunity for capture at the district level without being detected and 
sentenced.    
                                                 
11 In theory, the education administration at district level is supported by local agents of the ‘Zones 
Administratives Pédagogiques’ (ZAP), who cover almost all primary schools within one Commune.  The agents 
should distribute the cash funds to the schools of their Commune.  Although, in practice, their function is mainly 
administrative and the schools acquire the grants directly from the CISCOs. 
12 Data on posting at CISCO level are not available.   9
Third, transfer of the payments to the schools was conditional upon submission of a 
budget plan from the schools.  A newly created institution, the Fiarahana ombon’antoka ho 
Fampandrosoana ny Sekolo (FAF), which was made up of parents of current and former 
students, of the director of the school, and of other people of the region, needed to present a 
work plan in which it explained the use of the funds.  Further, before getting the grants, the 
schools had to provide the number of children at their schools as the payments were to be 
allocated as per student grants.  When the student numbers were aggregated at the central 
level, the program turned out to be under-funded, and the amount of funds was adjusted, 
albeit limited.  This, however, created some uncertainty on how much schools were to 
receive.   
Fourth, since the mail distribution system is slow in Madagascar, the policy was also 
announced and explained via the mass media.  The mass media campaign was to stimulate 
monitoring from the intended recipients of the education funds, i.e. the local schools and 
parents.  The media campaign included newspapers, radios, and TV.  The information on the 
abolishment of the public school tuition fee was reported widely in the media and broadcasted 
on national and local radios and TV.   
 Finally, after the elections, the new government replaced many district officials as 
part of the transformation of the bureaucracy.  While the objective of the replacement of 
officials was not specifically linked to the education programs, these changes could have had 
an impact (see further). 
 
4.  Measuring Capture and Its Determinants 
Our analysis quantifies capture of the HIPC cash contributions in the supply chain of 
the education sector of Madagascar.  First, we look at discrepancies between the HIPC funds 
recorded as sent by the central government and as received by the district facility levels.    10
Second, we investigate differences between HIPC grants at the district levels and the schools.  
Finally, we calculate indicators for a series of explanatory variables. 
 
4.1. Data   
We use three different sets of data sources.  First, during the last semester of 2001, the 
Ilo program of Cornell University in collaboration with the National Agricultural Research 
Centre of Madagascar (FOFIFA), conducted a countrywide commune survey, which included 
1385 communes, i.e. 99% of all communes in Madagascar.  The goal of the survey was to 
collect detailed information at the communal level on various demographic, social and 
economic issues, including access to public goods and services.    
Second, to evaluate the socio-economic situation after the 2002 crisis, the National 
Statistical Institute (INSTAT) in cooperation with FOFIFA and the Cornell Ilo program, 
organized a survey in 150 communes
13 at the end of 2002.  The major purpose of the survey 
was to evaluate the impact of the crisis on economic activities and social service delivery.  
The stratified sampling frame was designed to be representative at the national and provincial 
level.  Districts were divided in six strata depending on the distance to the capital of the 
province (close, medium, far) and on the availability of a tarred road.  In each stratum, one 
district was selected for every province.  In each district (36 out of 111 in total), four 
communes were selected randomly.  
In each commune, two public primary schools were surveyed: one in the centre of the 
commune and one remote school that was at least 3 km away from the centre.  Given the size 
of the population in cities, these were treated differently.  In Antananarivo, the nation’s 
capital, 12 public primary schools were surveyed.  In each provincial capital, six public 
                                                 
13 Out of 1392 Communes in total, i.e. more than 10% of the Communes.   11
primary schools were visited.  The survey covered 326 schools in total, of which 85% were in 
rural areas; 15% were in urban areas.  
  Third, to collect specific information on the money flows of the public education 
programs, we organized a budget tracking survey at government, district facility, and school 
level in April/May 2003.  The purpose of the survey was to provide nationally representative 
data on budget allocations and leakages in the education sector of Madagascar, more 
specifically in the context of the new educational policy.  To ensure compatibility, the surveys 
on government, district and school level were held at the same time.  In this new survey, more 
than half of the schools included in the post-crisis survey were revisited.  The survey was 
conducted in the whole of Madagascar.  In each province, four districts and 13 communes 
were surveyed - see Annex I for a map with details.  In total, 24 districts (more than 20% of 
the total) and 185 public primary schools were surveyed, of which 73% were located in rural 
areas.  After data checking and testing, we ended up with reliable data on 176 schools.  
 
4.2.  Measuring capture 
Following Reinikka and Svensson (2004a), we calculated the following indicator of 
capture, 
i c;  
i c  = 1 –
i 1 i
i
agent for intended agent from funds
agent by received funds
−
                        (1) 
where  1 i agent −  is the organization higher up the chain (e.g. district level) from  i agent  
(e.g. school level).  An indicator of 1 indicates full capture; 0 means no leakage.  Using this 
indicator, we calculated capture at each district and at each school.   
As it was difficult to verify the exact amount of funds that left and arrived at district 
and at school level, we tried to collect as much physical evidence as possible (bank 
statements, signed receipts etc.) to quantify the gaps between district facility levels and   12
schools.  In the case where this was not possible, our enumerators based themselves on the 
amounts reported as sent and received at both levels.  
  Theoretically, the intended cash funds from the centre/district facility level should be 
the product of the number of students in the public primary school and the HIPC contribution 
per student.  However, in reality this was often not the case, as the records of the number of 
students at the central level were not updated.  Before the crisis, children did have to possess a 
birth certificate to be accepted in public schools.  This condition was annulated in a 
significant number of schools post-crisis or alternatively, communes made sure that enough 
copies were available to ascertain that more children could go to school.  Consequently, the 
real growth in enrolment at the school level was considerably different from the central 
government statistics.  Therefore, we measured the amount of intended funds for schooli by 
the amount recorded as sent to schooli in the district’s accounts.   
The accounting at school level is generally accurate, as the schools have no clear 
incentives to misreport their resources.  The schools are subject to the supervision of the 
parents-teachers association and the accounting is not the basis for any type of funding and it 
is not submitted to any district or central authority.
14  Our interviews and anecdotal evidence 
indicate that there is very little incentive and possibility for potentially corrupt school 
directors to embezzle part of the school funds.  In contrast, our interviews confirmed that 
significant capture existed at the district level.   
 
4.3. Results 
Our empirical analysis shows that there was almost no capture at the central level.  By 
April 2003, the divergence between the HIPC cash grants recorded as sent by the central 
authorities and as received by the district facility levels was very low: 98% of the funds 
                                                 
14 The situation in Madagascar is similar to the situation in Uganda as described in Reinikka & Svensson 
(2004a).   13
arrived at district level.  Based on our interviews, it appears that (a) the small gap mainly 
reflects minor accounting errors at the government or district level, rather than capture, and 
(b) that monitoring played an important role.  Capture of funds at the central level was very 
difficult as the Ministry of Education was subject to relatively detailed inspections and pre-
audit procedures.  
  This intensive level of monitoring reflected the new emphasis on good governance by 
both donors and the new government.  First, the new president made the fight against 
corruption one of his policy priorities.
15   Second, an important part of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) of Madagascar deals with issues related to good governance.  This was 
also implemented in practice: during the school year 2002-2003, the World Bank – together 
with the rest of the donor community – organized four audits at the Ministry of Education.  
The results are described in the ‘Aide-Mémoires’ (World Bank, 2003).   
However, despite this new governance strategy and intensive monitoring, there was 
still significant local capture at the district level and strong variation in capture between 
districts.
16  The degree of capture of HIPC cash funds at the district level is summarized in 
Table 1.  Overall, 20% of the public primary schools visited (i.e. 36 schools) recorded to have 
received less than the district officer noted as sent.
17   
                                                 
15 The official presidential elections took place in December 2001.  The presidential candidate, Marc 
Ravalomanana, won a majority of votes, but as the incumbent did not want to step down, the country was ruled 
by two presidents during a period of six months.  The low popularity of the former president, Didier Ratsiraka, 
who was the single largest figure in Malagasy politics from 1975 to 1992 and under whose rule there were some 
obvious cases of presidential nepotism (Marcus, 2004), and the strong desire for a new leader put Ravalomanana 
in office in June 2002. 
16 Furthermore, in most places it took considerable time for the funds to arrive.  The Cornell Ilo survey at the end 
of 2002, three months after the start of the new policy, found that only 40% of the public schools had received 
the funds; 60% had not yet received anything. 
17 In those cases where the stated discrepancy was smaller than 1 US Dollar, we considered the deviations as 
reporting errors rather than theft.  In a country where 71% of the population lives below the poverty line and 
where the average daily wage of a teacher (paid by the parents-teachers association) in the poorest areas equals 
half a dollar a day, we believe this amount is a reasonable lower limit of corruption.  Moreover, we believe that 
this absolute lower limit is more accurate than considering a relative divergence smaller or equal to 1% of the 
total funds as measurement error as in this case we would ignore substantial capture in five schools (where the 
relative percentage missing was approximately 1%).  The discrepancy was only smaller than 1 US Dollar in one 
percentage of the total sample of schools.  There were no reports of schools getting more funding than allocated.   
   14
For the schools with capture, the average difference amounts to 35% of the intended 
HIPC contribution.  The data show strong provincial differences.  Toliara, in contrast to 
Antananarivo, seems to be the worst performer as on average 15% of the cash grants meant 
for the public primary schools disappeared.  
  Table 1 also shows leakage of HIPC cash funds measured as a dummy variable.  The 
variable equals one if there is an inconsistency between the district and school records 
concerning the distribution of HIPC grants; and zero otherwise.  Although the province of 
Fianarantsoa does not show a high degree of capture, still 37% of the schools received less 
than they should have received.    
  In the following sections we first develop a series of hypotheses on the determinants of 
capture and afterwards a formal econometric analysis. 
 
5.  Theory and Hypotheses 
Consider a service delivery chain made up of consecutive agents, with agent 0 at the 
central level (starting point), and agent I at the local school (end point).  Take agent i at some 
point in the service delivery chain (and 0 ≤ i ≤ I).  Agent i is monitored from above by     
agent i-1, and from below by agent i+1.  We assume that agent i is an expected rent (π
i) 
maximizer.  S/he will try to extract as much of the public funds as possible for private gains, 
taking into account possible penalties if s/he gets caught.  Formally, agent i maximizes:  
i i i i i i
c
q α ) α (1 c      ) c ( Max
i − − = π                 ( 2 )  
where 
i c  represents capture, measured as a share (0 ≤
i c ≤ 1) of the total funds s/he handles
18, 
i α  is the probability of getting caught, and 
i q  is the effective penalty agent i has to pay if s/he 
                                                 
18 To start, we ignore variations in the funds handled by agents.  This assumption is not crucial for our results 
and can be easily changed.  We started with this assumption since our main focus is on the monitoring and 
information issue.  Besides, in the empirical analysis we focus on cross-district variations in funds and capture –   15
gets caught.  We assume that the risk of getting caught is a positive and convex function of 
the degree of capture, so: 
  ) (c α   α
i i i =       with      0 c / α
i i > ∂ ∂   and      0 c / α
2 i i 2 > ∂ ∂          (3) 
Maximizing (2) and taking into account (3) yields the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:  
  0 ) q c .( α ) α 1 ( c / ) c (
i * i i
c
i i * i i < + − − = ∂ π ∂    and     
i c =  0     
0 ) q c .( α ) α 1 ( c / ) c (
i * i i
c
i i * i i = + − − = ∂ π ∂    and      0 <
i c < 1         (4) 
0 ) q c .( α ) α 1 ( c / ) c (
i * i i
c
i i * i i > + − − = ∂ π ∂    and     
i c = 1 
With 0 <
* i c < 1 (i.e. with an interior solution), at the optimal level of capture, the marginal 
benefits of increasing capture  ) α (1
i − , equal the marginal costs for agent i,  ) q c .( α
i * i i
c + . 
However, the risk of getting caught is not only dependent on the degree of capture, but 
also on a set of exogenous variables which influence the cost of information, monitoring, etc., 
and hence the likelihood for agent i of getting caught.  We define 
i z  as a vector of these 
exogenous variables (and we will discuss the variables in more detail later).  Consequently, 
we can write that: 
) z , (c α α
i i i i =                   ( 5 )  
With an interior solution, we can then derive the impact of 
i z  on the optimal level of 
capture 













α ) α 1 ( α 2








                     (6) 
where subscripts represent first derivatives and double subscripts represent second 
derivatives.  We assume that the exogenous variables, affecting the cost of information, 
monitoring, etc. affect 
i α  directly (hence 
i
z α ≠ 0), but do not affect the marginal effect of 
                                                                                                                                                          
which eliminate the main source of fund size variations between stages in the chain.  Furthermore, we control for 
variations in school (and thus funding) size through control variables in the empirical analysis.    16




c = = ∂ ∂ .
19  Under these assumptions, 
it follows that the sign of 
i * i z / c ∂ ∂  is determined by the sign of 
i
z α : with  0 α
i
z > , 
0 z / c




j m  as the direct monitoring cost of agent i by agent j.  This cost includes 
the cost for agent j to inspect agent i (e.g. travel cost, opportunity cost of time etc.).  With 
higher monitoring costs for agent j, the likelihood for agent i of getting caught decreases.  
Hence 0 m / α
i
1 i
i < ∂ ∂ −  and  0 m / α
i
1 i
i < ∂ ∂ + , and consequently, as we derived earlier, the signs 
of these terms determine the sign of 
i
j
* i m / c ∂ ∂ .  Hence our first set of hypotheses is that the 
optimal level of capture increases with the monitoring costs of the agents above and below in 
the service delivery chain:  0 m / c
i
1 i
* i > ∂ ∂ −  and  0 m / c
i
1 i
* i > ∂ ∂ + .   
 Second,  define 
i
1 i k +  as the cost for agent i+1 to obtain information on the services and 
funds which should be delivered by agent i.  With higher information costs for agent i+1, the 
likelihood for agent i of getting caught decreases.  Hence  0 k / α
i
1 i
i < ∂ ∂ + , and our second 
hypothesis is that the optimal level of capture increases with the information costs of the 
agent below in the service delivery chain, so  0 k / c
i
1 i
* i > ∂ ∂ + . 
      Notice that these “information costs” can be caused/affected by structural 
characteristics of both the supply of information and of the consumption of information.  We 
will return to this issue in the next section when we discuss indicator variables. 
Third, define 
i v  as the quality and effectiveness of the local justice system in which 
agent i operates.  As we will document later, this varies considerably between different 
                                                 
19 There is no evidence strongly suggesting otherwise; and even a less constraining assumption (e.g. like  i
cz α  
being small compared to  i
z α ) would be sufficient.   17
regions in Madagascar.  With a more effective local justice system the likelihood for agent i 
of getting caught if s/he captures public funds, will increase and thus  0 v / α
i i > ∂ ∂ . 
Consequently, our third hypothesis is that the optimal level of capture will decrease with the 
quality of the local justice system ( 0 v / c
i * i < ∂ ∂ ). 
  Fourth, our other hypotheses have to do with the impact of human and social capital. 
The impact of these capital variables will differ along the service delivery chain.  Define 
i ha s  
the human capital and
i s as the social capital of agent i.  Human capital is typically positively 
related to entrepreneurship and skills in various activities.  Therefore we can expect that an 
agent i with more human capital will be more able to avoid detection in capturing funds, e.g. 
by using more sophisticated methods.  This would imply that  0 h / α
i i < ∂ ∂ , and hence that 
0 h / c
i * i > ∂ ∂ : the level of capture will increase with the human capital of agent i.     
For similar reasons, the effect of more human capital of agents at different levels in the 
chain will be the opposite.  More human capital endowments of agents above and below in 
the service delivery chain will increase the effectiveness of their monitoring and the 
likelihood for agent i to be caught.  This implies that  0 h / α
1 i i > ∂ ∂
−  and  0 h / α
1 i i > ∂ ∂
+  and 
hence that  0 h / c
1 i * i < ∂ ∂
−  and  0 h / c
1 i * i < ∂ ∂
+ : the level of capture will decrease with higher 
human capital of the agents above and below in the service delivery chain. 
Social capital will allow agents to use their social networks either to avoid being 
caught or to help monitoring and prevent capture.  For example, if agent i belongs to a local 
elite s/he may receive protection and assistance from this network when attempting to divert 
funds.  Consequently, the chances of getting caught will be lower ( 0 s / α
i i < ∂ ∂ ) and the 
optimal level of capture of agent i will increase with his social capital ( 0 s / c
i * i > ∂ ∂ ).  This 
hypothesis is consistent with findings that local elites divert services to themselves, at the   18
expense of non-elites (e.g., Rubio, 1997; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999, 2000, 2006; 
Warren, 2004).  On the other hand, the probability for agent i to be caught with capture will 
increase if agents above and below in the service delivery chain can rely on social networks to 
assist them in monitoring agent i.  This implies that  0 s / α
1 i i > ∂ ∂
−  and  0 s / α
1 i i > ∂ ∂
+  and 
consequently that  0 s / c
1 i * i < ∂ ∂
−  and  0 s / c
1 i * i < ∂ ∂
+ : the level of capture will decrease with 
the social capital of agent i-1 and agent i+1.  
 
6. Empirical  Model 
  To complement our insights and to econometrically quantify the determinants of 
leakage of cash funds, we estimate a model with the following structure,   
ij




i ε η) λ, , s , h , v , k   , m ( c + = + f                  (7) 
where c
i represents capture as the dependant variable, and εij is an error term.  Our dependent 
variable is a school-specific measure.  Furthermore, the model identifies seven explanatory 
variables 
i
j m  , 
i
1 i k + , v
i, h
ij , s
ij , λ and η.  
The first explanatory variable is 
i
j m , the monitoring cost.  We use two specific 
measures to proxy for this variable.  First, district_capital measures the distance (in 
kilometers) from the district facility level to Antananarivo, the nation’s capital.  Second, 
district_school measures the distance (in kilometers) from the district facility level to the 
public primary school.  Given the general lack of infrastructure and means of transport in 
Madagascar, this variable is a valid measure of the geographical isolation of the district 
facilities.  Less remote districts, i.e. compared to the agents above – the central education 
authorities – or below – the schools – in the service delivery chain, will be more easily 
accessible by the respective agents and thus imply lower inspection costs.  Consequently, it is   19
expected that smaller distances to the districts from inspecting agents above or below in the 
education chain will lower capture at district level.   
The second explanatory variable measures the information cost 
i
1 i k + .  Several recent 
studies (e.g., Reinikka and Svensson, 2004a,b) show the importance of local, independent 
media as a tool to decrease information costs.  We consider the three main sources of mass 
media communication in Madagascar: radio, television and newspapers.  First, we use the 
number of local (private) radio stations (radio) – i.e. the number of private radio stations that 
the community members report they can receive clearly – as our key proxy for media.  Based 
on the results from our field research (see further), this measure is the most important 
instrument to capture and quantify media access as radios play an important role in 
Madagascar.  They are the main source of mass media communication, especially in rural 
areas.  The National Household Survey of 1997 (INSTAT, 1997) showed that a high 45% of 
all households are in the possession of a radio and according to the Commune Census of 2001 
(Cornell University, 2001) approximately half of all communes (48%) have access to a local 
radio.  We only take into account the private radio stations because while in theory the 
government’s Radio National Malagasy (RNM) broadcasts nationwide, in reality this is not 
the case.  During our field interviews, we discovered that many rural communes do not 
receive any public radio signal at all or in case they do, the broadcasting is unclear.
20   
Second, we will measure the impact of the number of regional (private) television 
stations (television) – i.e. the number of private television stations that the community 
members report they can receive clearly –  on capture.  According to the Commune Census of 
2001 (Cornell University, 2001) 18% of all communes have access to regional television.   
Third, the number of newspapers (newspapers) – i.e. the number of newspapers that 
the community members report they can obtain in the commune – is used as our last proxy for 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, there are no reliable data on effective access to the public radio broadcasting.   20
media. According to a recent study of Andriantsoa et al. (2005) only 6% of the Malagasy 
population reads a newspaper.  Newspaper circulation is concentrated mostly in urban areas, 
and few newspapers are available in remote and rural areas.  Moreover, many people are 
illiterate in these areas.   
Fourth, by using the number of media outlets – and not just access to media – as our 
benchmark, we take other important factors into account, as for example, schools may be 
informed about the new educational policy through other people with media access and the 
access of schools to mass media can fluctuate.
21     
The costs of information not only depend on the supply of information, e.g. through 
media, but also on the ability of people to process the information.  In particular, local radio 
and television stations are more important tools to reduce capture in less educated areas as the 
population has less human capital to obtain information from other sources.  To measure 
whether the impact of local media on capture is conditional upon the characteristics of the 
population, in particular upon the literacy rate in the commune, we include interaction terms 
of the media variables with the degree of literacy in the commune (radio*literacy  and 
television*literacy).     
The quality and effectiveness of the local justice system (v
i) is measured by a dummy 
variable (red_district) with value one if the district is officially a red or highly unsafe district 
(i.e. a district where more than 50% of the communes suffer from an extremely high 
insecurity level); and zero otherwise.  These red districts are insecure due to the presence of 
organized crime organizations (as the Dahalo
22), which is a good indication of the lack of a 
well functioning judicial system.  
                                                 
21 Partly because of the variation in how often the head teacher has access to a newspaper, Reinikka and 
Svensson (2004b) use the proximity to a newspaper outlet as an instrument for the exposure to the media 
campaign. 
22 The ‘Dahalo’ is a well-known crime organization in Madagascar that is specialized in large-scale zebu theft.   21
Human capital (h
ij) of the different agents in the service delivery chain will affect 
capture.  We expect higher educated district leaders to capture funds in a more sophisticated 
manner and hence experience a lower risk of detection.  We define human capital at district 
level (h
i) as a categorical variable measuring the education level of the district director 
(educ_district).  On the other hand, higher educated agents (above and) below in the service 
delivery chain will experience a lower monitoring cost as their capability to obtain 
information will be higher.  Our measure of human capital at school level (h
j) is the quality of 
the parents-teachers associations’ leadership, defined as the degree of literacy in the commune 
(literacy).     
The impact of social capital (s
ij) on capture will also vary by agent.  A district officer 
who is born in the district where he operates, has more informal connections than a 
newcomer.  While his social capital could be an incentive to him to perform well (e.g., 
Putnam, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1994), our approach accommodates the opposite concern 
that local elites seek to divert services to themselves, at the expense of non-elites (e.g., Rubio, 
1997; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999, 2000, 2006; Warren, 2004).  Our proxy for social 
capital at district level (s
j) is the origin of the district leader (origin_district), defined as a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the district head is born in the district where he 
operates; and zero otherwise.   
Finally, different control variables (λ) are included in the regression.  According to the 
theory of Reinikka and Svensson (2004a), the bargaining power of the school vis-à-vis the 
district officer will depend on her size.  First, we use the relative school size (schoolsize), 
quantified by the size of the public primary school as a percentage of the total size of all 
primary schools, public as well as private, in the district, as our measure.
23  Second, the 
dummy variable of cyclical droughts (drought) equals one if the commune was hit by two or 
                                                 
23 Because the district officer is responsible for the distribution of the HIPC as well as the CRESED funds and 
the latter are also donated to private primary schools, we believe this variable will give us the most accurate 
measure of the school’s bargaining power.     22
more droughts, i.e. heavy income chocks, during the last four years (1998/2002).
24  Parents 
who have to deal with cyclical shocks will care more about their family’s instant needs then 
about education, so we expect this variable to have a positive impact on capture.  Third, after 
the elections, the new government replaced many district officials as part of the 
reorganization of the bureaucracy.  While the objective of the replacement of officials was not 
specifically linked to the education programs, it might be that these changes had an impact on 
capture.  We measure the impact of the new representation on capture using a dummy 
variable (new_district) with value one if the district director is new in his position from the 
beginning or during the school year 2002/2003, i.e. after the appointment of the new 
president; and zero otherwise.  Fourth, five regional dummies – corresponding with the 
provinces Antananarivo, Toamasina, Mahajanga, Toliara and Antsiranana – are included to 
capture additional fixed effects (η).  The reference region is Fianarantsoa.  
In short, our complete empirical model looks as follows (8), 
ij 11
10 9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2   1   0
i
ε η λ β
β β β β β  
    β β   β β β β c
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where c
i is censored from below
25, i.e. c
i ≥ 0. The model suggests β1, β2, β6, β7, β8, β9, β11> 0;     
β3, β4, β5, β10 < 0.  
 
7. Results 
7.1.  Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2.  In our sample, the average distance from 
a district facility level to the capital, Antananarivo, is 561 km.  However, there are large 
variations, with a maximum distance of 1235 km.  The average distance from district facility 
                                                 
24 Our data on cyclical droughts are consistent with the data of the Organisation for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA; http://ochaonline.un.org). 
25 The majority of schools visited were not subject to capture, i.e. c
i equals zero.   23
level to public primary school is 26 km.  The maximum distance is 107 km.  The average 
literacy rate is 67% with large variation between communes.  The lowest literacy rate is 7% 
and the highest 97%.  Looking at the district characteristics, 28% of our sample of public 
primary schools is situated in highly insecure districts.  Approximately half of the schools 
have a district director who is born in the district and the majority of district officers obtained 
a university degree. The remaining group of directors completed at least the first cycle of high 
school.  Finally, the average relative school size is 1.3% of the total school size in the 
commune, thus on average 1.3% of all children who go to primary school in the commune 
will go to the schools in our sample.  Twenty-seven percent of our sample of schools is 
situated in a commune that experienced cyclical droughts during the 1998-2002 period.  After 
the elections, the new government replaced 89% of the district officials.   
Around three quarters of the communes (74%) has access to local radios.  The number 
of local (private) radio stations fluctuates from 0 to 15, with 26% of the sample without 
access to any local radio.  Overall, the average number of local radio outlets is 4 and the 
median is 3.  Access to television and newspapers is much less.  Only a little over one quarter 
of the communes (28%) has access to local television.  There is only one commune with 
television, but no radio access.  Newspapers are available in 24% of the communes.  The 
number of regional, private television stations ranges from 0 to 6 and the number of 
newspapers from 0 to 4.   
Table 3 illustrates the degree of variation of local (private) radio stations between and 
within the six provinces of Madagascar.  Antananarivo shows the highest coverage of regional 
radio stations, while Toliara shows the lowest coverage.  Historically, media activity 
concentrated in Antananarivo as foreign missionaries needed to remain close to the Queen 
and her royal court.  Although slightly diminished over the years, this geographic   24
concentration remains a central feature of the Malagasy media even today (Andriantsoa et al., 
2005).   
Access to regional radio outlets varies considerably within provinces.  Toliara shows 
the lowest variation in regional radio stations.  Fianarantsoa is on average covered by 2.7 
regional radio stations with a range from 0 to 7 private radio outlets.  Despite the general 
geographical concentration of the media, external influences as support from international 
non-governmental organizations made regional radio stations available, even in extremely 
remote and poor areas with low population density.
26   
 
7.2.  Determinants of leakage 
The first model was estimated using a probit regression.  Given that 80% of the 
observations show no evidence of corruption, we decided to treat capture as a 0-1 variable.  
The dependent variable takes the value of one if there is capture of cash funds; and zero 
otherwise.  To address the problem of any kind of intra-district correlation and arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity, we use robust standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the 
districts.  The results are shown in Table 4.  As there is some concern on correlation between 
our key variables and some of the provincial dummies, we test for the significance of the 
variables with and without the provincial dummies.  We also present the regression results 
with all key variables entered separately.   
District_capital comes out highly significant and with the predicted sign, both separate 
(Columns 1 and 2) and together with our other explanatory variables (Columns 7 and 8), 
meaning that a higher distance between the capital and the district facility level increases the 
probability of capture.  On the other hand, the distance between the district facility level and 
the school (district_school) does not affect the incidence of capture (Column 3).  We thus find 
                                                 
26 Unfortunately, our data can not provide first-stage evidence that the number of radio or television stations 
affected the information community members have about school funding. 
   25
that monitoring “from above” – which is measured by distance from the centre – has a strong 
impact on capture.  The inspection cost of the central monitoring agencies will increase with 
the geographical isolation of the district and therefore more remote districts will experience 
less control from the centre and thus suffer more from local capture.  Considering that the 
government – with support of the donors – increasingly relies on decentralized interventions 
and entities to improve educational services, this indicates important constraints on 
decentralization of public service delivery, in particular in the most remote areas. 
The key variable to capture the media effect is radio in the first model.  However, 
there are some potential problems with including radio in the model as such.  Areas suffering 
from substantial local capture of public funds could be areas that, in general, are lagging 
behind in their development.  For this reason these areas could have less media outlets 
compared to other, more developed, regions.  If this is the case, our radio variable could 
suffer from unobserved heterogeneity.  One of the solutions to this problem is to measure the 
exposure to the media campaign by taking into account the average number of regional radio 
stations in the district, taking out the number of radio stations in the respective commune.  
Therefore, we use the variable radio_mean in order to reduce endogeneity problems.   
Radio_mean has a significant coefficient estimate with the right sign, both individually 
(Columns 4 and 5) and jointly (Columns 7 and 8).  Consistent with our expectations, we find 
that information on the disbursement of public funds to the intended beneficiaries – which is 
measured by the number of local radio outlets – is a powerful monitoring tool “from below” 
that empowers citizens at the bottom of the service delivery chain in their interactions with 
local officials and politicians and, thereby, decreases capture of public expenditures.  These 
findings are consistent with the results of Reinikka and Svensson (2004b). 
The interaction term (radio_mean*literacy) enters significantly at the 1%-level with a 
positive sign, meaning that the impact of local radio access on reducing capture is more   26
important when illiteracy is more widespread.  This is as we expected.  A higher literacy rate 
increases the ability to get informed, so the need for mass media as information tools is lower.  
Regional mass media might therefore be important in alleviating capture and corruption, 
especially in less educated areas.  
Moreover, red_district appears to be highly significant with a positive sign, suggesting 
that the probability of leakage increases with the level of insecurity in the district.  This 
finding is consistent with our expectations.   
A higher educated district leader (educ_district) appears to capture significantly less.  
This is not as we expected.  On the other hand, according to our model, schools that are 
situated in less educated areas experience a higher likelihood of capture as their ability to 
achieve information will be lower (and thus their monitoring cost will be higher compared to 
schools in better educated areas). This expectation can be confirmed as the variable literacy 
enters highly significantly with a negative sign.   
The variable origin_district could be claimed to be endogenous, as district officers 
from districts with more leakage could already have been replaced in the past, implying that 
these districts show lower current leakage levels because of this.  Although this is a valuable 
argument, results of a recent World Bank study (Francken, 2003) show that historically there 
were few inspections in the education sector in Madagascar and in case of problems, 
sanctions were rare.  Therefore, we believe endogeneity not to be a serious concern.   
Origin_district, schoolsize and drought appear to be highly significant with a positive sign, 
suggesting that the incidence of cash leakage increases with the social capital of the district 
director, the relative school size and the occurrence of cyclical droughts in the district.   
Besides the result on school size, the remaining results correspond with our expectations.   
Finally, we do not find any significant effect of the new representation at district level 
(new_district; Column 8).  While there could be a problem of selectivity bias as maybe only   27
the bad district directors were replaced, the Ministry of Education indicated that all districts 
directors were to be replaced in the medium term.
27   
 
7.3.  Robustness checks 
We conducted some additional tests to verify the robustness of our results.  First, we 
dropped, one at the time, all observations from each province in Madagascar to see whether 
any province-specific effects drive the results.  The results remained intact.  Moreover, we 
examined the conditioning of the matrix of independent variables according to Besley, Kuh, 
and Welsch (1980).  If this number is large, there may be collinearity problems.  Our 
conditioning value equals 23, below the threshold value of 30 suggested by Besley et al. 
implying that there are no important collinearity problems.   
Second, we alternated the lower limit of corruption.  Table 5 illustrates the results 
when considering relative capture smaller then or equal to 1% (Column 1), 5% (Column 2) or 
15% (Column 3) as zero capture.  As expected, the results are similar to the results in Table 4.  
All key independent variables remain significant with their expected sign.  Although the 
impact of a change in the average number of regional radio stations (radio_mean), in the 
literacy rate (literacy) and in the interaction effect (radio_mean*literacy) on the capture of 
cash funds appears to be smaller in Columns 2 and 3, the impact remains significant.  Only 
the two variables that did not have the expected sign in our previous model, more specifically 
the education level of the district director (educ_district) and the relative school size 
(schoolsize), show to be insignificant in Table 5.
28                 
Third, to test the interpretation that the regression coefficients capture a causal effect 
of media rather than unobserved variation in other local characteristics, we included two 
                                                 
27 Furthermore, anecdotal evidence showed that one of the remaining district directors only started distributing 
the cash contributions after our visit, implying that he was not one of the best performing bureaucrats who 
deserved to stay in place.  
28 More precisely, the education level of the district director (educ_district) is insignificant in Column 1,2, and 3 
of Table 5 and the relative school size (schoolsize) is insignificant in Columns 2, and 3 of Table 5.   28
additional controls for local demographics: the population density in the commune 
(pop_density in Column 1 of Table 6) and the average household expenditures per month per 
commune (mean_exp in Column 2 of Table 6).  Both regressions show that our results are not 
driven by omitted variable bias.  Although the impact of an increase in the average number of 
regional radio stations in the district on capture of cash funds will be considerably smaller 
(approximately 3% in both columns of Table 6; compared to 13% in Column 7 of Table 4), 
the impact remains significant.  On the other hand, population density and the average 
household expenditures per month per commune do not have an impact on the probability of 
corruption.   
Finally, column 3 depicts the role of television and newspapers.  Besides regional 
radio, local television also has a negative, significant coefficient, suggesting that the 
likelihood of leakage will decrease with the number of local television stations.  The impact is 
also conditional on the literacy rate and is higher in less educated areas.  We do not find any 
significant effect of newspapers.  This result confirms our hypothesis that in a country with 
high illiteracy rates, radio and television are more important media instruments for 
information dissemination to the (poor) population.     
In summary, our results show that monitoring “from above” as well as “from below” 
plays an important role in the probability of capture of cash funds by local bureaucrats.
29  
Remoteness and insecurity of the district facility level increase the likelihood of local 
corruption while higher educated parents of students and a more extensive access of the 
schools to radio and television decrease the probability of capture of cash funds.  Moreover, 
our data reveal that the impact of radio and television is conditional upon characteristics of 
the population and will be higher in less educated areas.  Finally, communes that are more 
                                                 
29 Our findings are consistent with the results of several qualitative studies of the education sector in Madagascar 
(e.g., Brinkerhoff and Keener, 2003; World Bank, 2004).   29
frequently victim of climatic shocks and communes which are situated in districts run by a 
director who is born in the district suffer more from local corruption.      
 
8. Conclusion   
This paper examines the determinants of corruption by officials in a new public 
program with decentralized implementation in the education sector in Madagascar.  The 
analysis shows that local capture can be successfully constrained as our data reveal relatively 
low levels of capture, especially in comparison with other Sub-Saharan African countries.   
Our findings indicate the importance of monitoring “from above”, i.e. by the central 
agencies which are implementing the public policy.  This type of monitoring has a strong 
impact on the probability of capture as remoteness or geographical isolation increases capture 
of public funds.   
The presence of media reduces the probability of local capture, but the impact is 
conditional upon characteristics of the population.  When many poor are illiterate, the impact 
of newspaper and poster campaigns is limited, and radio and television are more important 
media tools.  Moreover, we find that the impact of local radio and television access is more 
important when illiteracy is more widespread.  It seems that the use of specific local mass 
media – especially in less educated areas – could therefore serve as a tool to increase the 
information level and thus help in the monitoring role of the beneficiaries.   
Finally, our findings taken together have implications for the debate on 
decentralization of public service delivery in developing countries as they indicate important 
constraints on decentralization, in particular in the most remote areas.  In order to increase the 
efficiency of public spending on services for the poor, decentralization is for this reason best 
implemented in conjunction with regular monitoring and evaluation audits at the 
decentralized levels.    30
ANNEX 
A.1.  Map of Madagascar with interviewed districts (Budget tracking survey, 2003)   31
A.2. Data  description 
Cash funds received = HIPC cash funds noted as received in the public primary school 
records (Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2003) 
Intended cash funds from the district facility level = HIPC cash funds recorded as sent to the 
public primary schools in the accounting of the district facility (Source: Budget Tracking 
Survey, 2003) 
District_capital = the distance in kilometers from the district facility level to Antananarivo, 
the capital of Madagascar (Sources: Post-crisis Survey, 2002; Commune Census, 2001) 
District_school = the distance in kilometers from the district facility level to the public 
primary school (Sources: Post-crisis Survey, 2002; Commune Census, 2001) 
Radio = the number of local (private) radio stations people report they can receive clearly in 
the commune (Source: Post-crisis Survey, 2002)  
Radio_mean = the average number of regional (private) radio stations in the district, taking 
out the number of radio stations in the respective commune (Source: Post-crisis Survey, 
2002)  
Television = the number of local (private) television stations people report they can receive 
clearly in the commune (Source: Post-crisis Survey, 2002)   
Newspapers = the number of newspapers that the people can obtain in the commune (Source: 
Post-crisis Survey, 2002)   
Red_district = dummy variable with value one if the district is officially declared as a red or 
highly unsafe district, which means a district where more than 50% of the communes 
suffer from an extremely high insecurity level (Source: Commune Census, 2001) 
Educ_district = the education level of the district facility director. It is a categorical variable 
(from 1 to 7) according to the years of study. Category 7 represents the group of district 
facility directors with a university degree (Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2003)     32
Literacy = the literacy rate in the commune (Source: National Population Census, 1993) 
Origin_district = dummy variable which equals one if the district facility director is born in 
the district where he is operating; and zero otherwise (Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 
2003) 
Schoolsize = the size of the public primary school as a percentage of the total size of all 
primary schools, public as well as private, in the district (Source: Cornell University 
Education Survey, 2003; Budget Tracking Survey, 2003) 
Drought = dummy variable of cyclical droughts equals one if the commune suffered from two 
or more droughts during the last four years (1998-2002); and zero otherwise (Source: 
Commune Census, 2001)  
New_district = dummy variable with value one if the district facility director is new in his 
position from the beginning of (or during) the school year 2002-2003, i.e. after the 
establishment of the new government (Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2003) 
Pop_density = population density in the commune (Source: Commune Census, 2001) 
Mean_exp = average household expenditures per commune per month (Source: National 
Population Census, 1993)   33
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Table 1: Capture of HIPC cash contributions (according to formula (1) and as a dummy variable) 
A. Capture according to formula (1) – in relative terms 
  Mean Median  St.  dev.  Maximum Minimum Observations 
All schools         
Capture  of  funds  0.07 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.00  176 
Per province         
Antananarivo  0.01 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.00  35 
Fianarantsoa  0.08 0.00 0.13 0.40 0.00  30 
Toamasina  0.08 0.00 0.23 0.86 0.00  30 
Mahajanga  0.08 0.00 0.27 1.00 0.00  29 
Toliara  0.15 0.00 0.26 0.75 0.00  25 
Antsiranana  0.06 0.00 0.20 0.91 0.00  27 
Schools with capture of funds (uncensored values) 
Capture  of  funds  0.35 0.29 0.32 1.00 0.01  36 
B. Capture as a dummy variable with capture = 1 
  Mean Median  St.  dev.  Maximum Minimum Observations 
All schools         
Capture of funds  0.20  0  0.4  1  0  176 
Per province         
Antananarivo  0.09 0 0.28 1  0  35 
Fianarantsoa  0.37 0 0.49 1  0  30 
Toamasina  0.17 0 0.38 1  0  30 
Mahajanga  0.17 0 0.38 1  0  29 
Toliara  0.40 0 0.50 1  0  25 
Antsiranana  0.07 0 0.27 1  0  27 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Unit  Mean  Med.  St.  dev. Max.  Min.  Obs. 
Determinants of capture 
District_capital  Km 560.7  473.0  410.7  1235.0  0.0  176 
District_school  Km 26.0  21.5  24.4  107.0  0.0 176 
Radio  Number 4.0  3.0  4.2  15.0  0.0  176 
Radio_mean  Number 4.0  2.9  4.1  15.0  0.0  176 
Television  Number  0.8 0.0 1.5 6.0 0.0 153 
Newspapers  Number  0.7 0.0 1.4 4.0 0.0 153 
Red_district  Dummy  0.3 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.0 176 
Educ_district  Category  6.8 7.0 0.7 7.0 4.0 176 
Literacy  Percent  66.9 71.2 23.7 96.6  6.9  176 
Origin_district  Dummy  0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 176 
Control Variables 
Schoolsize  Percent  1.3 0.7 1.3 7.2 0.1 176 
Drought  Dummy  0.3 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.0 176 
New_district  Dummy  0.9 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 176 
Pop_density  Hab/km
2  948.3 41.9  1899.6  7826.2 0.8  176 
Mean_exp  FMg  400467.9 363401.0 162985.7 788184.0 163672.0  174 
 
 
Table 3: Geographical distribution of regional (private) radio outlets (Radio) 
  Mean Median  St.  dev. Max.  Min.  Obs. 
Madagascar  4.0 3.0 4.2  15.0  0.0 176 
Per  province        
Antananarivo  9.9 10.0 4.3  15  3  35 
Fianarantsoa  2.7 2.0 2.4  7  0  30 
Toamasina  2.4 1.0 3.5  9  0  30 
Mahajanga  2.9 3.0 2.2  5  0  29 
Toliara  1.5 0.0 1.9  4  0  25 
Antsiranana  3.1 3.0 2.1  6  0  27 
   39 
Table 4: Capture of HIPC cash contributions from district to school level: Probit analyses   
  (1) dF/dx 
  (2) dF/dx 
  (3) dF/dx 
  (4) dF/dx 
  (5) dF/dx 
  (7) dF/dx 
  (8) dF/dx 
 
District_capital      0.0009*** 
(4.83) 
  0.0003** 
(2.14) 
        0.0003*** 
(2.74) 
 
  0.0003*** 
(3.13) 
District_school     0.0013 
(0.89) 






Radio_mean      -0.0334** 
(-2.34) 
  -0.0338** 
(-2.39) 
  -0.1304*** 
(-2.96) 
 
  -0.1469*** 
(-3.29) 
 
Radio_mean * literacy     
 
    0.0019*** 
(3.56) 
 
  0.0021*** 
(3.73) 
 
Red_district     
 
     0.3842*** 
(3.38) 
 
   0.3838*** 
(3.59) 
 








Literacy     
 
    -0.0075*** 
(-4.31) 
 
  -0.0071*** 
(-4.35) 
 
Origin_district     
 
    0.2251*** 
(3.70) 
 
  0.2431*** 
(4.22) 
 
Control  Variables  No No No No No Yes  Yes 
Schoolsize     
 






Drought     
 
     0.2831*** 
(3.32) 
 
   0.2433*** 
(3.10) 
 
New_district           0.0554 
(1.52) 
Provincial  Dummies  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
No.  observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Pseudo  R2  0.263 0.080 0.100 0.144 0.085 0.446 0.451 
Note: Dependent variable equals one if the district officer noted to have sent more cash funds than the schools claimed to have received; dF/dx reports the change in the 
probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables; results with robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering on districts; z-statistics are reported in parentheses; significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***.   40
Table 5: Capture of HIPC funds from district to school level: Results of probit regressions – robustness tests 
  (1) cut-off 1% 
dF/dx 
(2) cut-off 5% 
dF/dx 
(3) cut-off 15% 
dF/dx 
District_capital     0.0002*** 
(4.60) 
   0.0002*** 
(3.28) 
 
   0.0001*** 
(2.90) 
 








Radio_mean     -0.0494*** 
(-4.31) 
 
  -0.0318* 
(-1.90) 
 
  -0.0217** 
(-1.97) 
 
Radio_mean*Literacy     0.0007*** 
(4.45) 
 
  0.0005* 
(1.88) 
 
  0.0003* 
(1.87) 
 
Red_district      0.4995*** 
(5.21) 
   0.3839*** 
(4.33) 
   0.3375*** 
(4.40) 














  -0.0012* 
(-1.80) 
 
Origin_district      0.2142*** 
(3.83) 
 
   0.1034*** 
(2.66) 
 
   0.0459** 
(2.15) 
 
Control  Variables  Yes Yes Yes 









Drought      0.2430*** 
(4.96) 
    0.1283*** 
(2.70) 
    0.1250*** 
(3.09) 
Provincial Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations  176  176 176 
Pseudo R2  0.521  0.444 0.441 
Note: Dependent variable equals one if the district officer noted to have sent more cash funds than the schools 
claimed to have received; dF/dx reports the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each 
independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables; 
results with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on districts; z-statistics are reported in parentheses; 
significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***.     41
Table 6: Capture of HIPC funds from district to school level: Results of probit regressions – robustness tests 











    -0.0004 
(-0.74) 
 





























       0.3378*** 
(6.11) 
Educ_district 








       0.1760*** 
(2.65) 
 
Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 








Schoolsize     0.0155 
(1.63) 
 
Drought        0.2390*** 
(5.57) 
 
Provincial Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations  176 174 153 
Pseudo R2  0.144 0.155 0.491 
Note: Dependent variable equals one if the district officer noted to have sent more cash funds than the schools 
claimed to have received; dF/dx reports the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each 
independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables; 
results with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on districts; results with robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering on districts; z-statistics are reported in parentheses; significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are 
represented by *, ** and ***.    